BNY and Citadel Settle Tokenized Treasury Repo in Minutes as Chainalysis Charts 125% Surge
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AI agents discovered services and paid for them on a testnet, with HSBC settling in tokenized deposits plus real-time risk checks; in the same week Hong Kong ran the test and Singapore issued the governance framework, as Asia-Pacific moves to set the rules for agentic finance.
On October 9, Ant Digital Technologies and HSBC announced the completion of an AI-agent micropayment technical verification in Hong Kong: an AI agent autonomously discovered and invoked a digital service and initiated payment in the test environment, while HSBC performed real-time risk verification and settlement within the payment flow, with individual transactions typically under $2. The test used HSBC’s Tokenised Deposit Service (TDS) for settlement, Ant Digital’s Anvita Flow network for service discovery and payment orchestration, and ran on the Jovay Testnet, a Layer 2 blockchain environment.
This was only a technical verification, with no live customers and no commercial launch. But its timing matters: in the same week, the Monetary Authority of Singapore released Version 1.1 of the Safeguards for Agentic Finance at Runtime (SAFR) framework at the INSEAD summit, along with an open-source reference implementation. Hong Kong wired bank risk control into the machine-payment chain while Singapore wrote the rules for machine payments — two tracks in Asia-Pacific landing almost simultaneously.
Over the past year, payments between AI agents have mostly taken place on crypto-native protocols: x402 has completed roughly 109.6 million transactions with an adjusted value of about $15 million as of April; the Machine Payments Protocol launched by Stripe and Tempo settled about $25,000 within weeks of going live. These efforts showed that software can pay other software for a single API call or a slice of compute, but settlement assets were mostly stablecoins and risk control relied on on-chain logic.
The difference in the Ant Digital-HSBC test is that commercial bank deposits and risk control were moved into the same pipeline. HSBC TDS represents corporate deposits as on-chain digital certificates on a 1:1 basis, running on its own distributed ledger with 24/7 near-real-time transfers, covering Hong Kong, Singapore, Luxembourg, the UK, the US and the UAE. Risk checks stay on the bank’s side through an MCP interface; the agent runs, but the bank keeps its hand on the gate.
This test is not an isolated case. It sits on a timeline of regulated banks intensively validating AI-agent payments in 2026. In March, Santander completed an AI-agent-initiated payment using Mastercard’s Agent Pay infrastructure; in May, Switzerland’s Sygnum Bank ran AI-agent-driven transactions on a blockchain mainnet (with customer confirmation and signature for each transaction), and CaixaBank completed an AI-agent-initiated card transaction using Visa’s commerce tooling.
The Ant-HSBC collaboration goes back further. Ant was HSBC’s first tokenized-deposit client in Hong Kong (May 2025), completed the first cross-border transfer (USD between Hong Kong and Singapore) in September 2025, and on October 6-7, 2026 expanded the pilot to the UAE — intra-UAE dirham transfers plus USD cross-border payments, initiated through Ant’s WhaleRTP treasury platform and executed by HSBC in real time. From treasury settlement to AI-agent micropayments, the two companies have advanced along the same tokenized-deposit rail.
Market expectations are heating up in parallel. Juniper Research projects global agentic commerce transaction value rising from about $8 billion in 2026 to $1.5 trillion by 2030 (and $3.5 trillion with 1.3 billion users by 2031); McKinsey puts the 2030 range at $3-5 trillion. IDC expects active agents to grow from about 28.6 million in 2025 to 2.216 billion by 2030, an almost 80x increase in five years.
The Ant Digital-HSBC collaboration spans both corporate groups. Ant has continued to pour into blockchain and AI infrastructure, while HSBC treats tokenized deposits as a dual lever for retail and corporate banking. For institutions, the combination of tokenized deposits and stablecoins is becoming a “regulated machine settlement layer,” a narrative that has drawn growing backing from traditional financial institutions in the second half of 2026 — JPMorgan’s JPMD and BNY Mellon’s tokenized deposit service are advancing in parallel.
Direct listed targets are limited, but indirect exposure is clear: payment protocols betting on agentic commerce (the x402 ecosystem, Stripe MPP), tokenized-deposit first movers (HSBC, JPMorgan, BNY), and Southeast Asian digital-asset infrastructure companies. The gap between Juniper’s and McKinsey’s forecast ranges ($1.5T vs $3-5T) itself signals an early-stage track whose valuations have not yet been priced by consensus expectations.
For end users, the realized form of agentic payments is “subscriptions disappear, pay per use.” An AI agent invokes services on the user’s behalf and settles per use; micropayments push single-transaction costs down to a few cents, so users no longer need long-term subscriptions for services they use occasionally. The HSBC-Ant verification also demonstrated another scenario: when agents call services across borders, tokenized deposits keep funds moving 24/7 in real time, free from banking hours and cross-border settlement windows.
But users also face a new liability boundary: when an agent places a wrong order, exceeds authorized limits, or is hijacked externally, how is responsibility allocated? In 2022, a South Korean court ruled that a Bithumb user’s API key leak was the individual’s responsibility. When the paying party shifts from human to machine, the applicability of that precedent needs to be revisited.
The value of this verification is not in the technology itself but in what it confirms about the path to agentic finance: payment initiation can be delegated to machines, but settlement, risk control and compliance must remain in the hands of regulated institutions. Two directions are worth watching — first, “bank risk control as an interface” (standards like MCP and Agent Pay that turn bank capabilities into agent-callable interfaces), and second, “authorization and audit frameworks” (the SAFR 1.1 open-source implementation, the Agentic Payments Alliance’s agent identity standards). Whoever standardizes the trust layer for machine payments first gets the payment gateway of the next decade.

AI智能体在测试网自主发现服务、发起支付,汇丰用代币化存款+实时风控完成结算;同一周香港做验证、新加坡出治理框架,亚太抢占agentic finance规则话语权。
10月9日,蚂蚁数科与汇丰宣布在香港完成AI智能体微支付技术验证:AI agent在测试环境中自主发现并调用数字服务、发起付款,汇丰在支付链路里完成实时风险核验与结算,单笔金额通常在2美元以下。测试用汇丰代币化存款服务(TDS)承接结算,蚂蚁数科Anvita Flow网络负责服务发现与支付编排,链上交易跑在Layer 2区块链Jovay测试网上。
这只是一次技术验证,没有真实客户、没有商业上线。但它的位置很特殊:同一周,新加坡金融管理局在INSEAD峰会上发布AI代理金融运行时保障框架SAFR 1.1,并放出开源参考实现。香港负责把银行风控接进机器付款链路,新加坡负责给机器付款立规矩,亚太两条腿几乎同步落地。
过去一年,AI agent之间的支付多发生在加密原生协议上:x402截至今年4月累计完成约1.096亿笔交易、调整后金额约1500万美元;Stripe与Tempo联合推出的Machine Payments Protocol上线数周结算约2.5万美元。这些尝试证明软件可以为一次API调用或一小段算力向另一软件付款,但结算资产多是稳定币,风控依赖链上逻辑。
蚂蚁数科×汇丰的不同之处,是把商业银行的存款和风控搬进了同一条链路。汇丰TDS按1:1把企业存款表示为链上数字凭证,走自家分布式账本,支持24/7近实时划转,服务已覆盖香港、新加坡、卢森堡、英国、美国和阿联酋。风控通过MCP接口留在银行侧,agent在跑,但银行始终握着闸门。
这次测试并非孤例,它处于2026年监管银行密集验证AI代理支付的时间轴上。3月,桑坦德银行用万事达卡Agent Pay基建完成AI代理发起支付测试;5月,瑞士Sygnum银行在区块链主网跑通AI代理驱动交易(每次需客户确认签名),CaixaBank用Visa商业工具完成AI代理发起卡交易。
蚂蚁与汇丰的合作则更早。蚂蚁是汇丰香港首个代币化存款客户(2025年5月),2025年9月完成首笔跨境转账(香港↔新加坡美元),2026年10月6-7日刚把试点扩展到阿联酋——境内迪拉姆转账加美元跨境支付,经蚂蚁WhaleRTP财资平台发起、汇丰实时执行。从财资结算到AI代理微支付,双方在同一条代币化存款轨道上连续递进。
市场规模预期同步升温。Juniper Research预测全球agentic commerce交易额从2026年约80亿美元增至2030年1.5万亿美元(2031年3.5万亿、13亿用户);麦肯锡给出2030年3万亿至5万亿美元的区间。IDC预计活跃Agent数量从2025年约2860万增至2030年22.16亿,五年增长近80倍。
蚂蚁数科与汇丰的合作横跨集团层面。蚂蚁2025年通过安通控股收购好大夫在线、并持续加码区块链与AI基础设施,汇丰则把代币化存款服务视为零售与企业银行的双重抓手。对机构而言,代币化存款与稳定币的组合正在成为”受监管的机器结算层”,这一叙事在2026年下半年获得越来越多传统金融机构背书——JPMorgan的JPMD、BNY Mellon的代币化存款服务都在同期推进。
二级市场的直接标的有限,但间接敞口清晰:押注agentic commerce的支付协议(x402生态、Stripe MPP)、代币化存款先行银行(汇丰、摩根大通、BNY)、以及东南亚数字资产基建公司。Juniper与麦肯锡的预测区间差异(1.5万亿vs 3-5万亿)本身说明赛道处于早期,估值尚未被一致预期定价。
对终端用户而言,agentic payments的落地形态是”订阅消失、按次付费”。AI agent替用户调用服务、按次结算,微支付把单次成本压到几美分,用户不再需要为偶尔使用的服务长期订阅。汇丰与蚂蚁的验证还展示了另一个场景:agent跨境调用服务时,代币化存款让资金24/7实时流转,不再受银行营业时间与跨境结算窗口约束。
但用户也需要面对新的责任边界:agent下单出错、超出授权额度、甚至被外部劫持时,责任如何划分?2022年韩国法院曾判决Bithumb用户API密钥泄露属于个人责任。当付款主体从人变成机器,这条判例的适用性需要被重新审视。
这次验证的价值不在技术本身,而在它确认了agentic finance的落地路径:支付发起权可以交给机器,但结算、风控与合规必须留在受监管机构手中。对从业者而言,值得关注两个方向——一是”银行风控接口化”(MCP、Agent Pay这类把银行能力变成agent可调用接口的标准),二是”授权与审计框架”(SAFR 1.1开源实现、Agentic Payments Alliance的代理身份标准)。谁先把机器付款的信任层标准化,谁就拿到下一个十年的支付入口。

A day before the G20 summit, the FSB told finance ministers that no real-world stress has ever tested the crisis-management machinery for global stablecoins; days later, Singapore’s central bank chief barred stablecoins from wholesale settlement before the legislative window closes. Regulatory focus is shifting from “who can issue” to “what happens when something breaks.”
On October 12, the FSB conceded to G20 finance chiefs that the roughly $300 billion global stablecoin market, 99% pegged to the US dollar, still has cross-border crisis-management frameworks “untested in severe stress and insolvency.” Multi-issuer structures (USDC, Paxos Global Dollar) could see redemption pressure concentrate on a single entity while cross-border reserve rebalancing fails under stress. A week later, MAS Managing Director Chia Der Jiun publicly stated stablecoins do not guarantee par value and may be unsuited to large wholesale settlement, while pushing the Payment Services Act amendments (consultation closes October 16) to give them a legal status. Together, the two signals show global stablecoin regulation moving from admission compliance toward crisis management and settlement-hierarchy design.
On October 12, Financial Stability Board (FSB) Chair Andrew Bailey wrote to G20 finance ministers and central bank governors, attaching the report “Global Stablecoin Arrangements: Cross-border vulnerabilities and financial stability monitoring.” The report was commissioned by the US G20 presidency and submitted ahead of the October 15 G20 Finance Ministers meeting. Its core judgment is blunt: global stablecoins and their national regulatory frameworks remain “untested in severe stress and insolvency.”
Market size is the backdrop for weighing this warning. The FSB puts the stablecoin market at roughly $300 billion as of mid-2026, little changed from a year earlier. After nearly tripling between 2021 and 2025, the market has entered a plateau, yet 99% of its value is pegged to the US dollar. That aligns with the IMF’s August estimate. The FSB notes that dollar-linked instruments can produce currency substitution and pressure on domestic financial intermediation in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) — when a dollar-denominated stablecoin sells off under stress, the shock is not confined to crypto markets but reaches sovereign bonds and money markets.
The core risk structure named in the report is the “multi-issuer” arrangement, where multiple affiliated entities jointly share liability for a single stablecoin while each holds its own reserves. The report explicitly cites Circle’s USDC and Paxos Global Dollar as examples. In this structure, holders can redeem from any affiliate; once stress appears, redemption demand can concentrate on a single entity, while reserves scattered across jurisdictions make cross-border rebalancing prone to friction or outright failure. More vexing, issuers have almost no visibility into their own liability structure — who holds the tokens, or which country a redemption request will come from — because tokens trade 24/7 on pseudonymous public chains, while reserve assets and legal protections are anchored in specific jurisdictions and market operating hours.
The regulatory map still has large blank spaces. An FSB 2025 survey found that only 11 of 28 jurisdictions surveyed had completed stablecoin regulatory frameworks. The data foundation is equally thin: authorities rely on private data compilers whose coverage, transparency and methodologies differ, making it hard to accurately map holder geography and fund flows. The report lays out follow-up work: develop a set of metrics for financial stability monitoring and identify data gaps; better leverage existing data by encouraging cross-border analytical expertise, information sharing and coordination; and explore industry best practices for on- and off-chain data collection and compilation. The FSB proposes no crisis-resolution scheme of its own, and its recommendations carry no binding force — it reads more like a declaration that “we are not ready,” handing the hard questions to national regulators.
Around the same time, one of Asia’s most cautious financial centres offered a more concrete answer. On October 9, Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Managing Director Chia Der Jiun delivered a keynote at the INSEAD Digital Finance & Agentic AI Summit with unusually direct wording: stablecoins cannot be assumed to hold their par value and may be unsuitable for settling large wholesale transactions. He contrasted bank deposits with stablecoins — deposits maintain parity because they can be exchanged at par for central bank reserve money, “but this is not a given for stablecoins.”
Chia drew a clear settlement hierarchy: central bank money at the top, deposit tokens second, stablecoins at the bottom. Deposit tokens are expected to gain acceptance in banking use cases such as cash management, while stablecoins “may find wider adoption on crypto exchanges and in fintech payments,” and as private digital money scales, “CBDCs will ultimately be needed to anchor monetary stability.” He then raised a pivotal policy question: if some stablecoins become systemically important, would additional regulatory requirements — or even central bank reserve access — be needed? He did not say whether MAS supports reserve access.
The weight of these remarks lies in their timing: MAS is in the process of writing stablecoins into law. Its consultation on amendments to the Payment Services Act (reference P015-2026), published September 1 and closing October 16, would elevate the single-currency stablecoin framework to statutory status: licensed issuers must hold reserve assets at least equal to the par value of coins in circulation, redeem at par, and undergo stress tests at least quarterly (covering heavy redemption requests, difficulty liquidating reserves and settlement outages); interest payments to holders are banned; recovery and orderly wind-down plans must be shared with MAS; and issuers must technically be able to trace, freeze or destroy tokens linked to illicit activity. The amendments also propose letting MAS recognise a limited number of foreign stablecoins from equivalent regimes and exempt some multi-jurisdictional issuance arrangements from local incorporation and reserve requirements.
MAS is simultaneously building its own central-bank money layer. A wholesale Singapore-dollar CBDC has been available through the SGD Testnet since 2025, when DBS, OCBC and UOB completed the first live trial settling overnight interbank loans with it. Chia said MAS is now moving to settle tokenised MAS Bills with the wholesale CBDC — a trial first announced last November, with the first two issues dated September 23 and October 9. MAS’s logic is clear: let retail and crypto markets use regulated stablecoins, while anchoring wholesale settlement in bank and central bank money. Stablecoins are explicitly pinned outside the settlement hierarchy.

G20 峰会前一天,FSB 向各国财长承认:全球稳定币的危机处置机制未经任何真实压力检验;几天后新加坡央行行长在立法窗口关闭前,把稳定币挡在批发结算的门外。监管焦点正从”谁能发行”转向”出事怎么办”。
10 月 12 日,FSB 在致 G20 财长的报告中承认,规模约 3000 亿美元、99% 锚定美元的全球稳定币市场,其跨境危机处置机制”未经严重压力与破产检验”。多发行人结构(USDC、Paxos Global Dollar)的赎回压力会集中于单一实体,而储备跨境再平衡在压力下会失效。一周后,MAS 董事总经理 Chia Der Jiun 公开表态稳定币”不保证面值、不适合大额批发结算”,并推动支付服务法修正案(10/16 咨询截止)为其立法定位。两大信号叠加,全球稳定币监管正从准入合规转向危机管理与结算层级设计。
10 月 12 日,金融稳定理事会(FSB)主席 Andrew Bailey 致信 G20 财长与央行行长,并附上报告《Global Stablecoin Arrangements: Cross-border vulnerabilities and financial stability monitoring》。这份报告是应美国 G20 主席国要求、在 10 月 15 日 G20 财长会议召开前提交的。报告的核心判断极为直接:全球稳定币及其国家监管框架在”严重压力与破产情形下仍然未经测试”。
市场规模是理解这份警告分量的背景板。FSB 将 2026 年中的稳定币市场估在约 3000 亿美元,与一年前基本持平。经过 2021 至 2025 年近三倍的增长后,这个市场进入平台期,但 99% 的价值锚定美元。这与 IMF 今年 8 月的估算一致。FSB 特别指出,美元挂钩工具对新兴市场与发展中经济体(EMDEs)会产生货币替代和对国内金融中介的压力,一个以美元计价的稳定币在压力下抛售,冲击的不只是加密市场,还有主权债与货币市场。
报告点名的核心风险结构是”多发行人”(multi-issuer)安排,多个关联实体共同为同一个稳定币承担偿付责任,但各自持有独立的储备。报告明确举出 Circle 的 USDC 与 Paxos Global Dollar 作为例子。这种结构下,持有人可以从任意关联方赎回,一旦压力出现,赎回需求会集中涌向某个实体,而储备分散在不同司法辖区,跨境再平衡在压力下会遇到摩擦甚至失败。更棘手的是,稳定币发行人对自己的负债结构几乎一无所知,谁持有代币、赎回请求会从哪个国家来,发行人都无法掌握,因为代币在伪匿名的公链上 24/7 交易,而储备资产与法律保护却被锚定在特定辖区和特定交易时段。
监管地图上仍是大片空白。FSB 2025 年调查显示,28 个受访辖区中只有 11 个完成了稳定币监管框架。数据基础同样薄弱:当局依赖私有数据编译商,其覆盖范围、透明度和方法论各不相同,导致持有人地域分布与资金流向难以准确刻画。报告为此列出后续工作方向:开发面向金融稳定监测的指标体系并识别数据缺口;更好地利用现有数据,鼓励跨境分析专长、信息共享与协调;探索链上与链下数据采集和编制的行业最佳实践。FSB 没有提出自己的危机处置方案,其建议也不具有法律约束力,更像一份”我们还没有准备好”的声明,把难题抛给各国监管者。
几乎同一时间,亚洲最审慎的金融中心之一给出了一份更”落地”的答案。10 月 9 日,新加坡金管局(MAS)董事总经理 Chia Der Jiun 在 INSEAD 数字金融与智能体 AI 峰会上发表主题演讲,措辞罕见地直接:稳定币不能被假定保持面值,不适合用于大额批发结算。他对比了银行存款与稳定币,存款能维持平价,因为可以按面值兑换成央行储备货币,”但对稳定币来说这不是理所当然的”。
Chia 明确勾勒出一条结算层级:央行货币居顶,存款代币居次,稳定币垫底。存款代币预计在现金管理等银行业务场景获得接受,稳定币”可能在加密交易所和金融科技支付中找到更广泛的应用”,而随着私人数字支付的规模化,”最终需要央行数字货币(CBDC)来锚定货币稳定”。他进一步提出一个关键政策问题:一旦某些稳定币变得具有系统重要性,是否需要额外的监管要求、甚至给予其央行储备访问权。他并未表态 MAS 是否支持储备访问。
这番话的分量在于它的时间点:MAS 正在把稳定币写入法律。其《支付服务法》修正案咨询文件(编号 P015-2026)9 月 1 日发布,10 月 16 日截止,Chia 的演讲正好落在立法窗口关闭前一周。修正案拟将单一货币稳定币框架提升为法定规范:持牌发行人须持有至少等于流通代币面值的储备资产、按面值赎回,并接受至少每季度的压力测试(覆盖重度赎回请求、储备难以变现、结算中断等情景);禁止向持币人支付利息;要求与 MAS 共享恢复与有序清盘计划;技术上须能追踪、冻结或销毁与非法活动相关的代币。修正案还提议让 MAS 认可来自等效制度的一小批外国稳定币,并对部分多司法辖区发行安排豁免本地注册与储备要求。
MAS 同时在自建央行货币层。批发型新加坡元 CBDC 自 2025 年起通过 SGD Testnet 可用,当时 DBS、OCBC 与 UOB 完成了以它结算银行间隔夜贷款的首次实况试验。Chia 表示,MAS 现在正推进用批发 CBDC 结算代币化 MAS 国库券(MAS Bills),该试验去年 11 月首次宣布,9 月 23 日与 10 月 9 日已发行首批两期。MAS 的逻辑很清楚:让零售与加密市场使用受监管的稳定币,而把批发结算锚定在银行货币与央行货币上,稳定币在结算层级中被明确钉在门外。
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