The Two Faces of Stablecoins: Britain Pulls Them Into the System, Brazil Labels Them Money Laundering

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The Two Faces of Stablecoins: Britain Pulls Them Into the System, Brazil Labels Them Money Laundering

In the same week, London wrote stablecoins into its central-bank payment framework while Brasilia branded stablecoin FX swaps as money laundering. One asset, two verdicts, as global regulators fight over what stablecoins are.

Key Takeaways

On November 16, the Bank of England published near-final policy statements on sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins, locking in a reserve mix of short-term gilts plus central-bank deposits, a temporary £40 billion issuance guardrail per coin, and a Code of Practice due by year-end. The same day, markets digested the Banco Central do Brasil FX chief’s closed-door remarks labeling the “stablecoin sandwich” — selling coins to customers for cross-border conversion — as money laundering, reaffirming Resolution No. 561 already in force since October. Britain is pulling stablecoins into its central-bank payment system; Brazil is keeping them out. One asset, two verdicts: the compliance coordinates of stablecoins have become fully jurisdiction-specific.

Bank of England: The Last Gate Before Stablecoins Enter the Central-Bank Payment System

On November 16, the Bank of England published near-final statements of policy on systemic stablecoins, covering both supervisory processes and permissions. The legal basis is the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2023, which amended the Banking Act 2009. The regime targets sterling-denominated systemic stablecoin issuers and their settlement arrangements. With these policy pieces falling into place, Britain’s path for bringing stablecoins into the central-bank payment system has reached its final mile.

The reserve mix is the hardest constraint in this framework. The June 2026 policy statement set the anchor: short-term UK government debt up to 70 percent with a remaining maturity of no more than six months, and at least 30 percent held in central-bank deposits. Issuers that are systemic at launch may start with 95 percent short-term gilts and 5 percent central-bank deposits, gradually reaching the full mix as they grow. The design puts the reserve weight on the short end of the gilt curve, with central-bank deposits as the backstop, a clear easing from the more conservative orientation of the November 2025 consultation.

The quantity constraint has also landed. The Bank dropped the individual holding caps of £20,000 per person and £10 million per business proposed in the consultation, replacing them with a temporary issuance guardrail of £40 billion per systemic stablecoin. This swaps conduct-based controls for scale-based ones: as long as an issuer holds to the reserve structure, it can grow freely within the guardrail. The Code of Practice is still a draft, and the Bank intends to finalize it by the end of 2026, at which point all recognized systemic issuers must operate under it.

“A temporary issuance guardrail of £40 billion per systemic stablecoin applies instead.”
– Bank of England, policy statement on sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins, June 2026

The package responds to recommendations in the Financial Services Regulation Committee (FSRC) report of June 3, and interlocks with the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) crypto regime. The FCA finalized its crypto-asset rulebook in June, with the new mandatory authorization regime expected to take effect on October 25, 2027. For systemic stablecoin issuers, the Bank and the FCA supervise jointly: the Bank handles reserves, redemption and financial-stability guardrails, while the FCA covers consumer protection and conduct obligations. The same month, Bank of England governor Andrew Bailey warned at the IOSCO conference that information gaps in areas like stablecoins could mask risks and amplify contagion, making cross-border information sharing and earlier surveillance of leverage and liquidity urgent priorities.

Brazil’s Central Bank: The Same Week, Stablecoins Get the Money-Laundering Label

On November 13, Gerson Romantini, head of the foreign exchange division at the Banco Central do Brasil, made a clear statement at an industry meeting closed to the press: the “stablecoin sandwich” structure — selling stablecoins directly to customers who then convert them into fiat abroad for settlement — constitutes money laundering. He drew a parallel with the “dolar cabo,” Brazil’s long-standing informal cross-border money channel, calling stablecoins its digitized successor. “Clean money that passes through this arrangement has been marked as bad money,” he said.

Romantini’s verdict distinguished two models. The compliant model has a regulated institution use virtual assets as underlying settlement plumbing, replacing messaging and settlement channels like SWIFT; the customer never holds the tokens, and the transaction remains a foreign-exchange operation. The prohibited model has an institution sell stablecoins directly to customers, who take ownership and then convert them abroad to settle overseas obligations. He said the central bank and its regulation departments had assessed both models, concluding that “one is allowed and the other is not.”

The legal foundation is Resolution BCB No. 561, issued on April 30 and in force since October 1. The resolution rewrites the rules for international payment services (eFX). Article 50 states that settlement between an eFX provider and its overseas counterparty may only be made through a foreign-exchange operation or a non-resident real account in Brazil, “with the use of virtual assets prohibited.” Articles 56-A and 56-B further compress the room to maneuver: institutions without authorization must apply to the central bank by May 31, 2027, or stop offering the service within 30 days; records must be kept for ten years. Earlier resolutions 519 through 521 already reclassified fiat-pegged stablecoin transactions as foreign-exchange operations, bringing them under the central bank’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CFT) obligations.

“Anyone with good money who goes into this stablecoin market knows their money has become bad.”
– Gerson Romantini, head of FX division, Banco Central do Brasil, closed-door industry meeting, Nov 13, 2026

Compliance pressure on the market side is tightening in parallel. After the October 30 registration deadline, only about 40 crypto institutions entered the central bank’s licensing process, far below the 150 to 200 expected. Minimum capital requirements range from R$10.8 million to R$37.2 million. Argentina’s Lemon platform has exited Brazil, calling the capital threshold disproportionate for its roughly 15,000 local accounts. The 3.5 percent tax on cross-border stablecoin transactions proposed in 2025 was postponed; Romantini’s remarks are read as a signal of reactivation, but the levy remains at the proposal stage, not yet formal law.

One Asset, Two Verdicts: The Jurisdiction-Specific Fate of Stablecoins

Set the two events side by side and the conclusion is clear: the compliance identity of a stablecoin is no longer determined by the asset itself but by the jurisdiction it operates in. London defines it as a “regulated payment instrument” — reserve structure, issuance caps and redemption obligations written into the central-bank supervisory framework, giving issuers a channel into the system. Brazil defines it as an “illegal substitute for foreign-exchange business” — any stablecoin conversion that bypasses the regulated FX channel is treated as money laundering.

This is not an isolated north-south divide but a global trend. The U.S. GENIUS Act framework takes full effect on January 18, 2027, with the OCC having finalized rules for permitted payment stablecoin issuers. The EU’s MiCA sets a 30 to 60 percent bank-deposit floor for electronic money token reserves. Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan are all building licensing-based issuance regimes. Emerging markets, meanwhile, tend to treat stablecoins as a threat to foreign-exchange controls: Thailand’s SEC has proposed caps of 5 million baht on daily deposits and withdrawals, and Taiwan’s FSC draft rules put issuance in the hands of bank-led entities. Brazil is not an isolated case but the extreme expression of the emerging-market FX-control logic.

Jurisdiction Stablecoin Positioning Key Constraints
UK (Bank of England) Regulated payment instrument 70% short gilts + 30% central-bank deposits, £40B guardrail per coin, FCA/BoE joint supervision
US (OCC/GENIUS) Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer (PPSI) 1:1 segregated reserves, 93-day assets, case-by-case yield review, effective 2027/1/18
EU (MiCA) Electronic Money Token (EMT) 30-60% bank-deposit reserve floor, redemption at par, interest ban
Brazil (BCB 561) Illegal substitute for FX business No virtual assets in eFX settlement, customer-held sandwich = money laundering, authorization by 2027/5/31
Taiwan (FSC) Bank-led licensed asset Non-banks need NT$300M paid-in capital, full reserves at fair value, effective 2027 Q1

For payment firms operating across borders, this comparison means the same product must be split into two logics by jurisdiction: file under the central-bank reserve rules in London, and keep customers from ever holding tokens in Brasilia. The imagined status of stablecoins as “global money” is being cut into fragments by jurisdictional boundaries, raising the value of cross-border compliance capability.

Implications for Practitioners

1
Reserve structure is the dividing line for stablecoin issuance
Britain caps short gilts at 70 percent with a 30 percent central-bank deposit floor, the U.S. OCC requires assets with maturities under 93 days, and the EU mandates a bank-deposit floor. These reserve lists are not mutually compatible. Issuers planning multi-jurisdiction operations need to build separate reserve books against each jurisdiction’s eligible-asset list rather than betting on a single “globally compliant” standard.

2
Whether the customer holds the token decides whether cross-border payments are compliant
Brazil’s verdict offers a reusable test: when an institution uses virtual assets as underlying settlement infrastructure and the customer never holds the tokens, it is a compliant FX business; when the institution sells stablecoins to customers who convert them abroad, it is money laundering. Cross-border payment products should treat “customer ownership” as the red line, keeping tokens at the institutional settlement layer wherever possible.

3
Emerging-market FX-control logic will keep spreading
Brazil is not an isolated case. Thailand has proposed a 5 million baht daily cap, Taiwan has handed issuance to banks, and emerging markets broadly treat stablecoins as a channel for bypassing FX regulation. Firms running stablecoin business in capital-control jurisdictions should build FX reporting, travel-rule and reserve attestation into the product architecture from day one, not as an afterthought.

4
The central-bank deposit share is a new negotiating variable
Britain lets issuers systemic at launch start with 95 percent short gilts and 5 percent central-bank deposits, the U.S. allows deposits in eligible assets, and the EU floor is 30 to 60 percent. The higher the central-bank deposit share, the greater the dependence on central-bank balance sheets and the larger the impact on issuance cost and returns. This variable will determine the commercial attractiveness of stablecoins across jurisdictions.

5
2027 is the global acceptance year for stablecoin regimes
The UK FCA mandatory authorization regime takes effect on October 25, 2027; the U.S. GENIUS framework on January 18, 2027; Taiwan’s subsidiary rules are expected in Q1 2027; and unauthorized Brazilian eFX providers face a May 31, 2027 deadline. Practitioners should treat 2027 as the compliance switch year, completing license applications and reserve restructuring 6 to 12 months in advance.

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